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Criticism of judicial activism has become commonplace in 
political debate. In recent years it has been political conserva-
tives who have most often sounded the alarm that unelected, ac-
tivist judges are intruding on the prerogatives of the elected 
branches. This criticism traces to the Warren Court era, when 
conservatives called for "judicial restraint" or "strict construc-
tionism" in place of liberal judicial activism, contending that 
"when liberal Courts overturn democratically enacted laws in fa-
vor of liberal, activist constitutionalism, they destroy citizens' 
rights to democratic participation and self-government. " 1 Ac-
cording to these critics, "liberal, activist judges" substitute their 
personal preferences for the will of the people. 2 
The controversy over judicial activism has become an im-
portant issue in recent election campaigns, as well as a central 
concern in debates over Supreme Court nominations. In 2004, 
for example, former Attorney General John Ashcroft claimed 
that "intrusive judicial oversight and second-guessing of presi-
dential determinations ... can put at risk the very security of our 
nation in a time of war."' While much of the attack on judicial 
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activism is populist in nature, academics and judges-such as 
Robert Bork, Charles Fried, Antonin Scalia and Michael 
McConnell-make similar arguments. Professor McConnell, for 
example, has objected that "rule by judges" is "inconsistent with 
the principles of self-government."• At the time of his appoint-
ment, Justice Scalia expressed concern about an "imperial judi-
ciary."' 
Yet the claim that conservative judges are more restrained 
than their liberal counterparts has also been challenged, espe-
cially in connection with decisions rendered by the Rehnquist 
Court. The National Director of the ACLU declared that the 
Rehnquist Court had become "one of the most activist courts in 
American history."" Critics of the Rehnquist Court have claimed 
that conservative justices were quite activist when the substan-
tive outcome satisfied their ideological preferences. 
Justices may find restraint more palatable when they agree 
with the policy consequences of the government action being 
evaluated. Indeed, the potential for conflict between the justices' 
substantive ideological orientations and their professed belief in 
judicial restraint may manifest itself along several institutional 
dimensions. Conservative justices' substantive preferences for 
conservative policies may conflict with legislative, gubernatorial 
or judicial policy choices made at the state level (see Bush v. 
Gore, for example), all of which may be produced by elected 
bodies in the states. In this situation, not only are conservative 
justices faced with a conflict that implicates their commitment to 
judicial restraint, but to federalism as well. Or the justices' pref-
erences may conflict with outcomes produced by the coordinate 
branches in the federal government. Thus, the justices may be 
faced with constitutional challenges to federal legislation, or to 
constitutional or statutory challenges to federal administrative 
actions, that require them to evaluate the propriety of decisions 
rendered by the elected Congress and the President. In these 
situations, the justices must decide whether to defer to the 
elected branches or substitute their own judgments for those of 
elected officials. Yet in doing so, they may find they face a ten-
4. Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Tramforming 
Moral Convictions IIllo Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1538 (1989). 
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lution of Conflict Between Individual and State, 62 TUL. L. REV. 225. 227 (1987). 
6. Edward Walsh. An Activist Court Mixes lt.1· High-Profile Messages. WASH. 
POST, July 2. 2000, at A6. 
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sion between their preference about the substantive law or pol-
icy at issue and their commitment to judicial restraint. 
In this paper, we explore these various dimensions by fo-
cusing on the degree to which conservative rhetoric advocating 
judicial deference to the policy actions of the elected branches 
(at the federal and state levels) actually comports with reality. In 
particular, we focus on (1) the extent to which the rhetoric of ju-
dicial restraint characterizes the voting behavior of conservative 
justices faced with constitutional challenges to federal and state 
statutory law, and (2) the extent to which such rhetoric is consis-
tent with conservative justices' voting behavior in cases raising 
challenges to the administrative actions of the executive branch 
at the federal level. In our analysis, we equate judicial restraint 
with a tendency to uphold the decisions of legislators and federal 
administrative agencies. 
We find that, although in both instances conservative jus-
tices were somewhat more "restrainist" toward legislative and 
executive action, that restraint was contingent on the source of 
the law at issue. Thus, after controlling for ideological prefer-
ences regarding the substantive policies challenged in the cases, 
conservative justices were more deferential to state (as opposed 
to federal) legislation, and to action by executive branch (as op-
posed to independent regulatory) agencies. These findings sug-
gest that countervailing considerations may actually explain the 
conservatives' "restraintist orientation": (1) their ideological 
commitment to state power and principles of federalism, and (2) 
their ideological commitment to a powerful executive branch. 
Indeed, when read in tandem, our results reflect a conservatism 
that is particularly critical of congressional power. 
I. DIMENSIONS OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
Activism may take several forms. In his seminal article, 
Brad Canon defines six dimensions of judicial activism: (1) the 
degree to which policies adopted through democratic processes 
are judicially invalidated, (2) the degree to which earlier court 
decisions, doctrines or interpretations are altered, (3) the degree 
to which constitutional provisions are interpreted contrary to 
clear language or original intent, ( 4) the degree to which judicial 
decisions make substantive policy rather than preserve democ-
ratic processes, (5) the degree to which the judiciary eliminates 
discretion of other governmental actors and makes policy itself, 
and (6) the degree to which judicial decisions preclude serious 
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consideration of governmental problems by other political ac-
tors.7 
Given the federal structure of our government, counterma-
joritarian activism itself has two dimensions. Judicial review may 
be invoked to invalidate federal or state laws; however, the in-
validation of a federal law implicates somewhat different con-
cerns than the invalidation of a state law or local ordinance. 
When the justices wield their power of judicial review to strike a 
federal statute, their action implicates separation of powers is-
sues because the Court's decision challenges policy choices made 
by the coordinate branches. Similarly, when the justices invali-
date decisions and actions of the federal administrative agencies, 
they encroach on the President's policy making authority within 
the executive branch. Such actions raise the potential for re-
criminations by Congress and the President, including reversal 
through constitutional amendment or restrictions on judicial 
budgets, among other things.' Moreover, in terms of majoritari-
anism, an act of Congress or the President at least arguably 
represents the will of the majority of U.S. citizens, rather than 
the majority of citizens within a particular state. Thus invalida-
tion of congressional enactments and federal administrative de-
cisions has more immediate national implications and thus 
broader countermajoritarian consequences. In contrast, Canon 
suggests that voiding state laws is "arguably less offensive in 
principle. ,Y Practically, however, he recognizes that invalidation 
of a state or local law may also have national consequences to 
the extent such a ruling calls into question similar laws in other 
jurisdictions. Of course, such rulings are also "countermajori-
tarian" at the state or local level as well, and have the potential 
to alter the balance of power between the federal and state gov-
ernments. 
7. Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism. 66 
JUDICATURE 236.239 (1983). 
8. See, e.g .. James Meernik & Joseph lgnagni. Judicial Rn·iew ami Coordinate 
Construction of the Constillltion .. 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 447 (1997). On the question 
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Separation of Power Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts. 91 AM. POL. 
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II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ACTIVISM AND 
RESTRAINT 
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This section presents empirical data on the degree to which 
judges appear activist or restrained in reviewing legislation or 
administrative actions. We begin with a simple count of the rela-
tive frequency with which individual justices vote to strike a 
statute or decline to defer to an administrative agency decision, 
reported in Table 1. 
Table 1: Proportion of Votes Invalidating 
Legislation or Agency Action, By Justice 
Justice Votes to Invalidate Votes to Invalidate 
Statutory Enact- Agency Action 
ments 
Blackmun .544 .367 
Brennan .617 .480 
Breyer .441 .298 
Ginsburg .468 .310 
Kennedy .481 .358 
Marshall .572 .488 
O'Connor .435 .412 
Powell .310 .300 
Rehnquist .283 .280 
Scalia .415 .368 
Souter .527 .370 
Stevens .534 .391 
Thomas .439 .431 
White .316 .183 
A cursory look at these statistics provides some support for 
the assertion that conservative justices show more restraint. Jus-
tices White, Rehnquist, and Powell appear particularly deferen-
tial, while Marshall and Brennan were more aggressively activist. 
All the justices were more likely to strike legislation than agency 
action, although the relative difference varied widely among the 
justices. The association between conservatism and restraint is 
not strong, and the activism probabilities for Ginsberg and 
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Breyer are not materially different from those for Thomas and 
Scalia. 
Descriptive or bivariate statistics like those in Table 1 are 
suggestive, but they may generate false conclusions because of 
the absence of control variables that provide alternative explana-
tions for the votes. For example, this frequency distribution fails 
to account for the source of the statute or agency decision and 
the ideological direction of the enactment or agency action un-
der review. 
In the following section, therefore, we use multivariate re-
gression to compare the effects of several factors likely to influ-
ence the justices' votes in cases involving challenges to legislative 
enactments and agency action. These more comprehensive mod-
els include variables that account for the influence of ideology 
and the source of the policy at issue, while controlling for other 
factors that might influence judicial behavior in these important 
cases. We begin with our model of judicial review of legislation 
at the state and federal level, and then turn our attention to judi-
cial review of administrative agencies. 
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
Many of the most controversial Supreme Court decisions, 
and those most likely to be condemned as activist, involve in-
validation of legislation on constitutional grounds. The central 
purpose of this article is to examine the historic claims of judicial 
restraint by conservatives. Consequently, our primary hypothesis 
is that more conservative justices will be less likely to vote to in-
validate statutes on constitutional grounds. We recognize, how-
ever, that the decision to invalidate a statute may be shaped by 
federalism concerns. Indeed, one of the Rehnquist Court's most 
distinguishing characteristics is its preoccupation with federalism 
and states' rights, 1" and most of the Court's pro-state-rights deci-
sions may be attributed to the influence of the conservative jus-
tices on the Court. Our second hypothesis, therefore, is that con-
servative justices will be less likely to vote to strike state legislation. 
In addition, however, we also seek to evaluate whether the jus-
tices' alleged commitment to restraint is contingent on their atti-
tudinal reaction to the legislative policy at issue. Without ques-
10. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr.. The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002); Calvin Massey. Federalism and the 
Rehnquist Court. 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (2002): Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They 
Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477 (2001). 
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tion, the justices' votes are often substantially influenced by their 
ideolopical preferences regarding the substance of individual 
cases.
1 Our third hypothesis is that justices will be more likely 
vote to uphold legislative enactments whose substantive policies 
conform to the justices' ideological preferences. In addition to 
these hypothesized influences on the justices' voting behavior, to 
control for their effects, we also included other independent 
variables that have a likely influence on the justices' votes. These 
control variables are explained below. 
To evaluate our hypotheses, we coded the justices' votes in 
all cases heard by the Rehnquist Court during the 1986 through 
2004 Terms in which the constitutionality of a federal, state or 
local statute was challenged. The dependent variable is dichoto-
mous, coded as 1 if the justice voted to strike the statute and 0 
otherwise. 12 Our data included 2465 votes for analysis (1600 in 
cases involving state legislation, and 865 in cases involving fed-
eral legislation). We present three models: (1) Model 1 is esti-
mated based solely on the justices' votes in cases involving fed-
eral statutes; (2) Model 2 is estimated based on the justices' 
votes in response to challenges to state or local laws; and (3) 
Model 3 includes the votes of the justices in both federal and 
state/local cases. Because our dependent variable is dichoto-
mous, we estimate the models using logistic regression with ro-
bust standard errors, clustering on the individual justice. 
1. Variables and Measurement 
. Justice Ideo~ogy. !o '?easure. the )ustices' ideology, we r~-
hed on the Martm-Qumn Ideal pomts, · arranged such that posi-
tive scores are associated with liberal justices, negative scores 
with conservative justices. Although the Martin Quinn scores are 
calculated based on the justices' voting behavior, and thus may 
raise endogeneity problems for some analyses, we are less con-
cerned about that problem with respect to our model. In particu-
lar, we are not predicting the ideological direction of the justices' 
votes, but rather whether they voted to strike a challenged stat-
11. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH. THE SUPRE\1E COURT AND THE 
ATfiTL:DI~AL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
12. We are grateful to Rorie Spill Solberg. who was instrumental in collecting these 
data in connection with another co-authored project regarding judicial review. 
13. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn. Dvnamic Ideal Poim Estimation via 
Markov Chain Monte Corio jin the US. Supreme Cr~urt. /1)53-f'J'JI). ]() POL ANALYSIS 
134 (2002). 
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ute. Use of the Martin Quinn scores to construct an independent 
variable does not raise the same degree of concern. 
According to the conventional wisdom, conservative justices 
on the Rehnquist Court are attitudinally predisposed to reduce 
federal power vis-a-vis the states and to enhance or protect state 
authority. 1" We thus test the relationship between ideology and 
the propensity to strike legislation (i.e. be "activist") in the fol-
lowing fashion. Because higher values of Justice Ideology indi-
cate more liberal justices, a positive coefficient on this variable 
will indicate that conservative justices are less likely than liberal 
ones to vote to declare laws unconstitutional (therefore support 
the first hypothesis). In Model 1, a positive coefficient on the 
Justice Ideology variable will indicate that conservatives are less 
likely to vote to strike federal laws. In Model 2, a positive coeffi-
cient on the Justice Ideology variable will indicate that conserva-
tives are less likely to vote to strike state/local laws. In Model 3, 
these relationships are subjected to an additional statistical test. 
In that model, the Justice Ideology measure is multiplied by a 
dummy variable indicating whether the statute is federal (coded 
1) or state/local (coded 0). As a result, in Model 3, the coefficient 
on the ideology variable alone indicates the impact of justice ide-
ology in cases involving state or local legislation. A significant co-
efficient on the interactive term (Ideology*Federal Statute), 
moreover, will indicate that the effect ideology is different de-
pending on the source of the law being evaluated. 
In addition to the justices' ideological response to the 
source of the statute at issue, we also hypothesized that justices' 
propensity to strike state or federal legislation will be shaped by 
their preferences for the policy embodied in the challenged law. 
The variable Alignment with Statutory Direction (hereafter 
Alignment) therefore measures the degree of ideological agree-
ment between the justice and the statutory enactment. To con-
struct this variable, we assigned an ideological score to the indi-
vidual statutes using the directionality codes in the U.S. Supreme 
Court Database. Liberal statutes received a value of 1, and con-
servative statutes -1. To construct a variable measuring the con-
14. See, e g. Calvin Massey. Federalism and the Rehnquist Court. 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
431 (2002): Ernest A. Young. The Rehnqui.11 Court's Two Federalisms. H3 TEX. L. REV. 1 
(2004). Some have questioned the sincerity of the Court's commitment to federalism. 
however. suggesting that it was a mere front for conservative policy preferences. See. e.g .. 
Richard H. Fallon. Jr .. The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism De-
cisions. 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002): Peter J. Smith, Federalism. Instrumentalism, and 
the Legacv of the Rehnquist Court. 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 906 (2006). 
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sistency between the statute and the justice's ideologies, we sim-
ply multiplied the statute's ideology score and the individual jus-
tices' ideology score. Thus, the more extreme the justice's ideol-
ogy (and therefore the more extreme the justice's Martin-Quinn 
Score), the more extreme the value of Alignment. Positive values 
on this variable indicate that the justice supports the substantive 
goals of the legislation at issue, negative values the opposite. We 
therefore expect its coefficient to be negative (where support is 
high, the justice will be Jess likely to vote to strike). 
Age of Statute. The variables described above are of central 
relevance to our working hypothesis, but the literature also di-
rects us to other control variables that may influence the justices' 
votes. First, the justices may also be influenced by a statute's age. 
In his early study, Dahl presented findings that the bulk of cases 
in which federal legislation were declared unconstitutional oc-
curred more than four years after the legislation was enacted, 
and suggested that the Court was reluctant to invalidate legisla-
tion enacted by the "live" or current national majority. 1' Because 
we expect the justices to be more reluctant to invalidate laws 
from more recently elected legislative bodies, we included a 
variable in our models reflecting the age of the statutory enact-
ment. We expect a positive coefficient on this variable. 
Solicitor General. The influence of the Solicitor General at 
the Supreme Court is well documented,1" whether participating 
as amicus curaie or representing the federal government di-
rectly.17 The Solicitor's high win rate reflects a unique level of 
deference that is due either to institutional respect for the Ex-
ecutive Branch or the Court's recognition of legal expertise of 
the office. Our models thus include three dummy variables (So-
licitor involvement as amicus supporting the statute at issue, as 
amicus opposed to the statute, or as party representative) re-
flecting the Solicitor's Office presence in a given case. 
Amicus Differential. The Court may also be influenced by 
interest groups appearing via amicus briefs. Some research sug-
gests that amicus curiae have an influence on outcomes before 
15. Robert Dahl. Dt:cision-making in 11 Democran: The Supreme Courl liS 11 Nll-
tionlll Policv-m11ker. li J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). 
lli. See, e.g. RICHARD PACELLE. BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS: THE SOLICITOR 
GEl\ERAL AND THE STRl;CTLJRit\G OF RACE. GEt\DER. AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
LITIGATION (2003). 
17. Seth P. Waxman. Fore~<·orr/: Does the Solicitor General M11//erJ. 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 1115. 1117 (2001 ): David A. Strauss. The Solicitor General 1111d the Interest.\· of the 
United States. li1 LAW & CONTE~fP. PROBS .. Winter/Spring 199H. at 165. 172 (discussing 
the Solicitor's reputation at the Court). 
112 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:103 
the Court.'o We capture this possible influence through the dif-
ferential support of amici for the parties challenging or support-
ing the statute, measured as the number of amicus briefs sup-
porting the statute minus the number of amicus briefs opposing 
the statute. Larger positive values on this variable indicate 
greater support for the statute among the amici; negative values 
indicated that briefs opposed to a statute outnumbered those in 
favor. We thus expect a negative coefficient on this variable (the 
more amici in support, the less likely the justice will vote to 
strike the statute). 
Civil Liberties. The nature of the legal issues presented to 
the Court may also affect the justices' decisionmaking. Histori-
cally, the Court has been particularly protective of civil liberties 
claims grounded in the Bill of Rights, and some of these claims 
invoke the "strict scrutiny" standard of review of legislation.'~ 
Hence, we expect such statutes to be more subject to invalida-
tion and include the nature of the claim as a dummy variable, 
coded as 1 if a civil liberties challenge was brought to the statute, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Lower Court Invalidation. The Supreme Court often selects 
cases in order to reverse the lower court. To control for this se-
lection effect, our models include a dummy variable indicating 
whether the lower court (usually a Circuit Court of Appeals) in-
validated the statute (coded as 1) or upheld it (coded as 0). 
1 K. See, e.g .. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The lnjluem:e of Amiws 
Brief.\ 011 1he Supreme Courl. 14H U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000). 
1 '}. See Gerald Gunther. The Supreme Corm, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doclrine 011 a Clumging Courl: A Model jiJr a Newer Equal Prole<.:lion. H6 
HARY. L. REV. 1. K (1972) (famously proclaiming that such review was stnct m theory 
but fatal in fact). 
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2. Results 
Table 2: Logit Model of Justices' Voting Behavior in Cases 
Involving Judicial Review of Legislative Enactments, 1986-2004 
(with hypothesized direction of coefficients) 
Variable Modell Model2 Model3 
Federal Laws State Laws All Laws 
-.117 .223 .113 
Justice Ideology (+I-) (.070)* (.078)** (.065)** 
Alignment with -.352 -.207 -.260 
Statutory Direction (-) (.056)*** ( .061 )*** (.047)*** 
Ideology* Federal -.316 
Statute (-) (.070)*** 
-.581 
Federal Statute (-) (.218)** 
.002 -.001 -.001 
Age of Statute ( +1-) (.005) ( .001) (.001) 
-.869 -.802 -.817 
SG Support- Amicus (-) (.265)*** (.119)*** (.116)*** 
-.249 -.529 
SG Support-Party(-) ( .208) (.149)** 
.661 .529 
SG Oppose-Amicus(+) ( .179)*** (.149)*** 
-.020 -.019 -.023 
Amicus Differential (-) ( .030) (.014)t (.013)* 
Civil Liberties .574 .338 .420 
Challenge ( +) ( .227)** (.121)*** (.063)*** 
Lower Court .184 -.422 -.222 
Invalidation (-) (.136)* (.089)*** (.075)** 
-.788 .341 .360 
Constant (.277)** (.125)** ( .183)* 
Pseudo R-Square .074 .089 .082 
1082.17** 
Wald Chi-Square 158.78*** * 838.57*** 
N 865 1600 2465 
*p<.lO, p<.05, **p<.Ol, ***p<.001. All estimated using Stata 8.2 with 
robust standard errors clustered on the individual justice. Significance 
tests are one-tailed. 
114 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:103 
The three models presented in Table 2 reflect a complex 
portrait of the justices' votes in judicial review cases involving 
constitutional challenges to legislative enactments. First, it is 
clear from the tables that judicial ideology is a critical determi-
nant in the justices' voting behavior in judicial review cases. In 
Model 1, the Justice Ideology variable is statistically significant 
and negative. This indicates that liberals are less inclined to 
strike federal legislation and conservatives more likely to do so, 
directly contradicting our hypothesis that conservatives would 
show more judicial restraint than liberals. In Model 2, the oppo-
site ideological influence is evident with respect to state and lo-
cal legislation, with conservatives less likely and liberals more 
likely to vote to strike the law at issue. Finally in Model 3, the in-
teractive term between ideology and federal laws is negative and 
significant, confirming conservatives are significantly less defer-
ential toward federal laws compared to state laws. 
The Alignment variable measures the effect of congruence 
between the justices' policy preferences and the substantive ef-
fects of the statute being reviewed. In all three models the 
Alignment variable is highly significant and in the expected di-
rection. Thus, for all justices, activism is closely related to ideol-
ogy, as justices are much less likely to invalidate a law that is 
ideologically aligned with their preferences and more likely to 
vote to invalidate when the law contradicts their policy prefer-
ences. 
As for the control variables, most of them are statistically 
related to the dependent variable in the expected directions. The 
justices plainly respond to the position of the Solicitor General, 
whether the Solicitor participates as a party or amicus. In addi-
tion, with the exception of Model 1, the extent to which a posi-
tive differential exists between briefs filed in support of the stat-
ute and those filed in opposition to it affects the justices' 
willingness to strike legislation. At least in the case of state or lo-
cal laws, therefore, the justices are sensitive to public opinion as 
expressed through amicus briefs filed by interest groups. Fur-
thermore, the nature of the constitutional challenge matters: in 
civil liberties cases, the justices are more willing to vote to strike 
legislation, possibly because of the more stringent legal tests that 
are often applied in those cases. And the control for the nature 
of the Court's agenda is also statistically significant, yet the 
models reveal that the lower court variable operates differently 
in different contexts. Thus, in Model 1, if the lower court struck 
the statute below, the justices were also more likely to strike the 
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statute. This outcome is different than what we expected, given 
the justices' propensity to reverse. But in the context of a chal-
lenge to a federal statute, it may be that lower court judges exer-
cise caution in considering a constitutional challenge and choose 
to invalidate federal statutes only in extreme cases. In Model 2, 
however, the variable is in the expected direction (negative). At 
least in the case of state or local laws, the justices are likely to 
vote to reverse the lower court. Finally, the age of the statute at 
issue did not influence the justices' votes in any of the models. 
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
Our second analysis involves judicial review of federal 
agency decisions. In the context of administrative action the 
connections between judicial restraint and the democratically 
elected branches are not as obvious as in the case of legislative 
enactments. Yet even though many administrative personnel are 
themselves unelected, agency officials, even those of independ-
ent regulatory commissions, are more accountable for their poli-
cymaking decisions than are judges. Judicial restraint implies 
deference to decisions of administrative agencies because agency 
officials are subject to the ongoing supervision of the President 
and Congress. 
Presidents have many ways to influence administrative and 
regulatory policy. The President chooses the top levels of bu-
reaucratic personnel, and through these appointments exerts 
control over bureaucratic policy.2" Elena Kagan notes that every 
president since Ford has required proposed Federal Regulations 
to be approved by the White House before being issued, and can 
use executive orders and other tools to direct administrative ac-
tions.21 Although administrative personnel are not elected, they 
are closely accountable to the president. 
Congress controls the statutory authority and operating 
budgets which empower agencies. These tools give Congress a 
great deal of leverage over agency decisions. McCubbins and 
Schwartz, in their seminal paper likening congressional supervi-
sion of agency policymaking to "fire alarms" or "police patrols," 
explained that Congress has a myriad of indirect ways to monitor 
20. See B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman. The Dvnamics of Poliliwl Cwuro/ 
uf !he Bureaucracy, HS AM. POL. SCI. REV. HOI (I '!'!I): ~olan McCarty & Rose 
Razaghian. Advice and Consem: Senate Responses /o Execlllive Branch Nomi!llllions 
l/'11'15-JIJ'Jn. 43 AM. J. POL. SCI II22 (I'!'!'!). 
21. See Elena Kagan. Presidemial Admini.llrlllion. II4 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (200I). 
116 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:103 
agency policymaking.22 Even if Congress is not actively supervis-
ing the agencies, citizens and groups who oppose agency actions 
will bring them to Congress' attention. Congressional commit-
tees can then hold hearings or conduct investigations into agency 
actions. Weingast and Moran present empirical evidence that 
congressional preferences influenced the Federal Trade Com-
mission in the 1970s and 1980s, even without visible intervention 
into the commission's activities. 2) More recently Balla and 
Wright have shown that Congress can ensure that its views are 
represented in agency policymaking processes by influencing the 
membership of agency advisory boards.24 It is clear that Congress 
possesses significant tools to influence the actions of both execu-
tive and independent agencies, and that it has both the means 
and the incentive to exercise these tools. Because agencies are 
subject to continuous monitoring and control by both Congress 
and the President, their decisions are more closely connected to 
representative institutions than are court decisions. 
1. Hypotheses 
Given the agencies' ties to the elected branches, the same 
principles of judicial restraint should apply in this context as in 
the case of legislative enactments. Thus, if conservative justices 
are more committed to judicial restraint, this commitment 
should show up in a decreased likelihood of overturning the de-
cisions of administrative agencies. The primary hypothesis with 
regard to the Court's administrative law jurisdiction is that con-
servative justices will be less likely than liberal justices to vote to 
overturn decisions made by administrative agencies. 
The argument for judicial restraint may be stronger when 
the agency whose decision is being litigated is within the execu-
tive branch. Presidents exercise closer control over these agen-
cies, primarily because they can fire the heads of such agencies. 
Therefore, the connection between the democratic process and 
agency decisions may be closer in the context of executive 
branch agencies. Therefore, our second hypothesis is that the 
tendency of conservative justices to be more deferential to the de-
22. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz. Congressional Oversighr Over-
looked: Police Parro/.1· versus Fire Alarms. 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165,165 (19114). 
23. Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran. Bureaucralic Discrerion or Congressional 
Conrrol~ Regularory Policymaking hy rhe Federal Trade Commission. 91 J. POL. ECON. 
765 (19113) 
24. Steven J. Balla & John R. Wright, lnreresl Groups, Advisory Commiuees. and 
Congressional Conrrol ofrhe Bureaucracy. 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 799 (2001). 
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cisions of administrative agencies will be more pronounced when 
the decision was made by an executive branch agency. 
As discussed above, there is reason to believe that the per-
sonal ideologies of justices will influence their votes. Sheehan's 
1990 study s~o~s that ~upBort for agency decisi?ns is strongly re-
lated to thetr tdeologtes. · For example, Justtce Douglas sup-
ported 85 percent of liberal agency decisions, but only 33 percent 
of conservative agency decisions. These findings lead to a third 
hypothesis: a justice will be more likely to support administrative 
action when the policy effects of that action are consistent with the 
justice's policy preferences. 
To evaluate these hypotheses, we identified all cases heard 
by the Rehnquist Court during the 1986 through 2004 Terms in 
which the action of a federal administrative agency was chal-
lenged. Once we had identified the cases involving challenges to 
administrative action, we again used the Rehnquist Court Jus-
tice-Centered Database to construct our dependent variables. 
This coding process resulted in dichotomous dependent vari-
ables. In the context of challenges to administrative actions, the 
dependent variable is coded 1 if the justice voted to overturn the 
agency action and 0 otherwise. Our data included 2114 votes in 
cases involving challenges to administrative actions. 
2. Model 
With the above background and hypotheses, we operation-
alized variables to capture the qualities necessary for a test of 
the hypotheses, similar to the analysis of legislative invalidations. 
This section sets out and describes the independent variables 
and nature of the statistical test. 
Justice Ideology. We hypothesize that conservative justices 
will be less likely to vote to overturn agency decisions. To indi-
cate the justices' ideological predispositions we again use Martin 
and Quinn's Ideal Point Scores as discussed above. Alignment 
with Agency Action is calculated as in the analysis involving 
Alignment with Statutory Direction, based on the ideological di-
rection of the agency decision being reviewed. We expect higher 
levels of alignment to lead to lower propensity to overturn the 
agency action. 
25. See Regmald S. Sheehan. Administrlllive Agencies and the Court: A Reexamina-
tion of the Impact of Agency Type on Decisional Outcomes. 43 W. POL. Q. 875 (1990). 
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Agency Policy Direction is a categorical variable coded 1 
when the agency is arguing for a conservative policy position and 
-1 when the agency is advocating a liberal policy outcome. We 
computed this variable using the Spaeth database's variables in-
dicating the ideological direction of the lower court decision and 
the appellant or respondent status of the government agency. If 
the lower court decision was liberal, the agency policy position is 
coded as conservative if the agency is the appellant and liberal if 
it is the respondent. If the lower court decision was conservative, 
the agency policy position is coded as liberal if the agency is the 
appellant and conservative if it is the respondent. Previous re-
search has found that liberal agency decisions garner more sup-
port from Supreme Court Justices. 2' 
Executive Branch Agency is a dummy variable coded 1 if the 
agency is within the executive branch and 0 if it is not. The inclu-
sion of this variable is motivated by research investigating 
whether executive branch or independent agencies fared better 
in the Supreme Court. 27 It is used to evaluate whether agencies 
under the political control of the president are more or less suc-
cessful at attracting support from the justices. 
Party of President is a dummy variable coded 1 when the 
President is Republican and 0 when the President is a Democrat. 
In our data the only Democratic President is Clinton. This vari-
able is included to control for the ideology of the sitting presi-
dent. 2' 
Lower Court Support for Agency Action is a dummy vari-
able indicating that the lower court (usually a Circuit Court of 
Appeals) supported the agency action, introduced because of the 
Court's proclivity to reverse. 
To evaluate our hypotheses, we present three models. We 
separately estimate the effects of the independent variables on 
the justices' decisions in disputes emerging from executive 
branch agencies and from independent agencies, and then com-
bine these data to evaluate their effects in both types of cases. 
As noted, the dependent variable is dichotomous and so we util-
ize logistic regression to estimate our model; given the potential 
that the justices' individual votes would not be independent 
26. See Jeff Yates. Presidential Bureaucratic Power and Supreme Court Justice Vot-
ing. 21 POL. 8EHA V. 349 (1999). . 
27. See Donald W. Crowley. Judicial Review of Administrative Agencres: Does the 
Type of Agency Mauer~. 31 W. POL. Q. 265 (19k7): Sheehan, supra note 25. . . 
28. This political relationship has been suggested by research. See Jeffrey Yates. 
supra note 26. 
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across cases, we again clustered on the individual justice. We 
present the results of our data collection process and model es-
timation below. 
3. Results 
The three columns of numbers in Table 3 relate to justices' 
votes in cases emerging out of independent agencies, executive 
branch agencies, and all agencies, respectively. Our first hy-
pothesis, that conservative justices would be less likely to vote to 
overturn agency actions, suggests that Justice Ideology should 
have a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable. 
However, the negative, and very nearly significant (p=.100), co-
efficient for Justice Ideology in the first column shows that lib-
eral justices showed more support for independent agencies than 
conservatives. 
Moving to the second column of numbers, Justice Ideology 
docs show the positive and significant relationship with the de-
pendent variable predicted by the first hypothesis. With a coeffi-
cient (.105) nearly three times the size of its standard error 
(.039), this variable is highly significant and persuasively shows 
that conservative justices were more likely than liberal justices to 
defer to the decisions of executive branch agencies. The similarly 
positive and significant coefficient for Justice Ideology in the 
third column of numbers shows that this relationship persists 
when decisions from both types of agencies are considered. The 
negative and significant coefficient just below, for Justice Ideol-
ogy *Independent Agency, reflects the fact that conservative jus-
tices are significantly less likely to support decisions by inde-
pendent agencies compared to decisions by executive branch 
agencies. This result supports the second hypothesis, that con-
servative deference to administrative decisions will show up 
more in cases coming out of executive branch agencies than in 
cases coming out of independent agencies. 
Our third hypothesis concerns the effect of alignment be-
tween the justices' assumed policy preferences and the effect of 
the agency decision being evaluated. The Alignment with Agency 
Action variable reflects this relationship. The negative and sig-
nificant coefficients for this variable in all three columns indicate 
that justices are significantly less likely to vote to overturn deci-
sions whose policy results they support. This result supports our 
third hypothesis, and shows that justices' ideologies are impor-
tant in determining their stances toward agency decisions. 
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Table 3: Logit Model of Justices' Voting Behavior in Cases 
Involving Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Decisions, 
1986-2004 
Variable 
Justice Ideology ( +) 
Justice Ideology* 
Independent Agency (-) 




Party of President at 
Time of Court Decision 
Independent Agency 
Lower Court Support 


























































*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.OOl. All estimated using Stata 8.2 with robust 
standard errors clustered on the individual justice. Significance tests 
are one-tailed. 
The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 show that, in certain 
situations and after controlling for other likely influences, con-
servative justices are indeed more reluctant to overturn laws and 
agency decisions. However, the highly significant effects of 
Alignment with Statute's Direction (Table 2) and Alignment with 
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Agency Action (Table 3) show that policy agreement also influ-
ences these decisions. The regression results presented so far 
cannot tell us how much difference these factors make, but we 
can use these results to predict the probability that a particular 
justice will overturn a law or agency decision in particular cir-
cumstances. The next section does just that. 
C. THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY AND ALIGNMENT ON 
JUSTICES' DECISIONS 
Table 4 shows the predicted probabilities that justices with 
the ideological scores of Scalia, O'Connor, and Stevens would 
vote to declare state or federal laws unconstitutional. 2" The top 
four lines in the table relate to a conservative justice with the 
same ideological score as Justice Scalia. These results suggest 
that the source of the law does make some difference to a Justice 
like Scalia. For example, Justice Scalia's likelihood of opposing a 
liberal state law is .330, or four percent lower than his probabil-
ity of opposing a liberal federal law (.373). Likewise, Justice 
Scalia's probability of opposing a conservative state law (.121) is 
about two percent lower than his probability of opposing a con-
servative federal law (.143). However, the effects of the source 
of the law are dwarfed by the effects of the ideological nature of 
the law. 
2Y. The values in the table are calculated under the assumption that there are five 
more amicus briefs in favor of striking the laws than in favor of upholding the laws, that 
the law in question does not concern civil liberties. that the Solicitor General has submit-
ted an amicus brief in support of the law, and with the other independent variables set at 
their means. 
122 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:103 
Table 4: Predicted Probabilities of Vote to Strike Legislation 
Justice Source of Statute Probability of 
Simulated Statute Direction Vote to Strike 
Scalia State Liberal .330 
Scalia State Conservative .121 
Scalia Federal Liberal .373 
Scalia Federal Conservative .143 
Stevens State Liberal .292 
Stevens State Conservative .356 
Stevens Federal Liberal .162 
Stevens Federal Conservative .206 
O'Connor State Liberal .316 
O'Connor State Conservative .188 
O'Connor Federal Liberal .281 
O'Connor Federal Conservative .164 
According to the model, the probability that Justice Scalia 
would vote to strike a liberal state law is .330, while the probabil-
ity that he would vote to strike a conservative state law is only 
.121. This means that the change from a liberal to a conservative 
law lowers Justice Scalia's probability of voting against the law 
by about 21 percent. Similarly, these values show that Justice 
Scalia's probability of opposing a liberal federal law is .373, 
about 23 percent greater than his probability of opposing a con-
servative federal law (.143). 
Moving to a more liberal Justice, such as Stevens, changes 
the results somewhat. Stevens' probability of voting to overturn 
a liberal state law is .290, while his probability of voting to over-
turn a liberal federal law is .162, showing that he is about 13 per-
cent more likely to vote against a state law compared to a federal 
law. On the other hand, the differences in Stevens' predicted 
levels of support for liberal as opposed to conservative laws 
shows that the Stevens is about eight percent more likely to sup-
port liberal laws compared to conservative ones. 
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The bottom section of table 4 presents similar predictions 
for a Justice with Sandra Day O'Connor's ideology. As with Jus-
tice Scalia, the liberal or conservative nature of the law has a 
much greater impact on O'Connor's predicted votes compared 
with whether the law came from a state or the national govern-
ment. 
Moving to the predicted probabilities that justices will vote 
to overturn the actions of administrative agencies in Table 5, we 
see a similar story."' Justice Scalia is about 15 percent more likely 
to vote against liberal agency decisions compared to conserva-
tive ones, but only about 7 percent more likely to vote against 
independent agency decisions compared to executive branch de-
ClSlOnS. 
Table 5: Predicted Probabilities of Vote to 
Invalidate Agency Action 
Probability of 
Agency Vote to Invali-
Justice Type of Policy date Agency Ac-
Simulated Agency Direction tion 
Scalia Executive Liberal .390 
Scalia Executive Conservative .237 
Scalia Inde12endent Liberal .466 
Scalia lnde12endent Conservative .297 
Stevens Executive Liberal .264 
Stevens Executive Conservative .552 
Stevens Inde12endent Liberal .304 
Stevens Inde2endent Conservative .453 
O'Connor Executive Liberal .347 
O'Connor Executive Conservative .327 
O'Connor Inde12endent Liberal .364 
O'Connor IndeEendent Conservative .345 
. 30. These probabilities were calculated with all mdependent variables except Jus-
lice Ideology. Alignment "'ith Agency Decision, and Agency Policy Position set at their 
means. 
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For Justice Stevens, the effect of the ideological conse-
quences of the agency decision is striking. Stevens is nearly 30 
percent more likely to vote to invalidate a conservative decision 
by an executive branch agency compared to a liberal decision by 
such an agency. He is about 15 percent more likely to vote to 
overturn a conservative decision by an independent agency, 
compared to a liberal decision by the same type of agency. Jus-
tice Justice Stevens is four percent less likely to vote to invali-
date a liberal decision by an executive branch agency than a lib-
eral decision by an independent agency (.264 versus .304). 
However, when it comes to conservative decisions, Justice Ste-
vens is nearly 10 percent more likely to support executive branch 
decisions compared to decisions made by independent agencies. 
The bottom four lines of Table 5 present the predicted 
probabilities using Justice O'Connor's ideological score. Note 
that for Justice O'Connor the model generates predictions that 
are affected only slightly by the liberal or conservative nature of 
the agency decision, or the source of the decision. 
Overall, these predicted probabilities suggest that both the 
source of the law or action under consideration and its ideologi-
cal implications can exert meaningful influence on the likelihood 
that a justice will vote to overturn it. However, in most cases the 
effect of ideology appears to matter more than whether the law 
was made by the state or federal government, or whether the 
agency decision came out of the executive branch or an inde-
pendent agency. 
CONCLUSION 
Our findings yield some interesting conclusions about the 
association of conservatism and judicial restraint. The justices' 
votes in these cases are structured by their ideologies in two 
ways: ideology influences their responses to the source of the 
policy under review, as well as to the substantive content of the 
challenged policy. Conservative justices, like liberals, are ideo-
logical in their decision making but temper their ideologies with 
respect and deference for certain institutions. Conservatives 
show deference to state decisions and those of the executive 
branch, while not extending this deference to actions of the na-
tional legislature and the independent regulatory agencies often 
viewed as its agents. It appears that conservative justices do not 
show more judicial restraint across the board, but instead show 
deference to different institutions than do liberal justices. 
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The empirical results pertaining to constitutional review of 
laws suggest that conservative justices are more likely to show 
restraint when evaluating state laws, but liberals are more likely 
to show restraint when dealing with federal laws. Similarly, the 
results pertaining to review of administrative actions indicate 
that conservative justices show restraint (relative to liberal jus-
tices) when considering executive branch agency decisions, but 
not when considering decisions of independent agencies. It may 
be that, rather than a broad commitment to judicial restraint, 
these results indicate commitments to two different political 
principles: federalism and executive authority. Indeed, a com-
prehensive commitment to judicial restraint would presumably 
extend to the decisions of national lawmakers and independent 
agencies. It is difficult to see why members of Congress have less 
legitimacy than state legislators. And, whatever one may think of 
the constitutional status of independent regulatory and adminis-
trative agencies, if the justices are going to allow these agencies 
to exist then presumably their decisions should be accorded le-
gitimacy. Thus, it is possible that instead of judicial restraint 
these results indicate a commitment to a particular understand-
ing of the Constitution, one in which both states and the execu-
tive branch enjoy relatively great autonomy from legal restric-
tions (and the corresponding authority to put their preferences 
into policy). 
The second common point that emerges from these two sets 
of analyses is that the justices' policy preferences are the domi-
nant factor in their decisions. In all the analyses, a justice who 
disapproved of the policy consequences of the law or decision 
being challenged was much more likely to vote to overturn that 
law or decision. The predicted probabilities in Tables 4 and 5 
make this point very clearly. Thus, even though conservative jus-
tices showed greater judicial restraint in some contexts, their de-
cisions (along with those of liberal justices) were overwhelmingly 
the result of their views of good public policy. 
